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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO 
DEFENDANTS, 
The trial court determined that, since defendants answered disclaiming any interest 
in plaintiffs' property, plaintiffs' efforts to seek attorney fees were made in bad faith; the 
trial court then awarded attorney fees to defendants, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, plaintiffs' request for attorney fees was not made in bad 
faith, but was rather an attempt to seek reimbursement for attorney fees incurred as a result 
of defendants' bad faith conduct. 
A. Defendants did not prevail on any substantive issue during the litigation 
at the trial court level. 
The trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants was error because the issue of 
attorney fees, the only issue upon which defendants prevailed at the trial court level, is not a 
substantive issue upon which an award of attorney fees can be justified. The clear language 
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 states that "the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to 
a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith." (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs prevailed on 
the substantive issue of quieting title in their property. By awarding defendants attorney fees 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56, the trial court determined that defendants were entitled to 
an award of attorney fees because they prevailed on the issue of attorney fees. Plaintiffs 
have been unable to find any case law justifying such an award, and neither defendants nor 
the trial court have cited any such case law justifying this circular reasoning. 
Defendants refer to Highland Construction Co. v. Stevenson. 636 P.2d 1034 (Utah 
1981), to illustrate that a lawsuit can result in two prevailing parties. Plaintiffs do not 
dispute this fact. However, in Highland both parties prevailed on substantive issues. 
Highland, an excavating subcontractor, prevailed because Stevenson, the general contractor, 
voluntarily paid Highland the amount Highland claimed it had not received under the party's 
contract. Stevenson prevailed because the trial court found that Highland had breached its 
contract with Stevenson. Only Stevenson was awarded attorney fees. The Utah Supreme 
Court remanded the case for an award of attorney fees to Highland, based on the fact that 
Highland had prevailed on one substantive issue. The fact that Stevenson had also prevailed 
on another substantive issue did not preclude Highland from receiving an award of attorney 
fees. Id. at 1038. 
The present case can be distinguished from Highland in that both Highland and 
Stevenson had prevailed on a substantive issue involved in the lawsuit, whereas defendants in 
the case at hand did not. If this court affirms the trial court's award of attorney fees to 
defendants, it will essentially be deleting from section 78-27-56 the requirement that a party 
be a "prevailing party" in order to be entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to the bad faith 
statute. Such approval will result in future decisions that will be both illogical and 
unpredictable. The ends of justice will not be served by encouraging this type of faulty legal 
analysis. For these reasons, plaintiffs respectfully request that this court reverse the trial 
court's award of attorney fees to defendants. 
B. The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to defendants pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 because plaintiffs' actions were 
undertaken in good faith. 
The trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants was based on Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56, the bad faith statute, with the court apparently reasoning that the plaintiffs' 
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claim for attorney fees was not asserted in good faith pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, 
the quiet title statute, since defendants had disclaimed in their answer any interest in the 
property. (R. at 169-70.) Plaintiffs* claim for attorney fees was asserted in good faith, 
despite defendants' disclaiming any interest in the property, because of defendants' bad faith 
conduct necessitating the filing of plaintiffs' complaint. 
Defendants interpret plaintiffs' efforts to obtain a quit-claim deed from Defendant 
Miller and a disclaimer of interest from Defendants Anderson as constituting a claim by the 
plaintiffs that the defendants had an obligation to assist plaintiffs in quieting title to their 
property. Such a claim, defendants argue, is without merit pursuant to Draper v. LB. & 
R.E. Walker. Inc.. 204 P.2d 826 (Utah 1949), and Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 
P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988). In both cases, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
award of damages to property owners who were forced to initiate legal action in order to 
quiet title. 
Contrary to defendants' assertions, plaintiffs have never argued that Defendant 
Janice Miller had an obligation to assist plaintiffs in their efforts to quiet title in their 
property. However, plaintiffs did seek documents verifying defendants' admitted lack of 
interest in the property. The need for such documentation arose because, after years during 
which both parties recognized and acquiesced in the fence line as constituting the boundary 
between the parties' properties, as evidenced by Defendant Miller's execution of deeds and 
filing of subdivision plat maps acknowledging the fence as the boundary line (R. at 31, 42, 
46-48), defendants suddenly asserted an interest in plaintiffs' property adjacent to the fence 
when plaintiffs finally began to subdivide parts of their property. At the June 15, 1994 
meeting of the American Fork City Planning Commission Defendant Miller, on behalf of her 
daughter and son-in-law Defendants Anderson, asserted an interest in the property pursuant 
to Defendants Anderson's application for an occupancy permit. As a result of defendants' 
unexpected assertion of interest in the property, the American Fork City Planning 
Commission denied approval for plaintiffs' subdivision and building permits, as well as 
denying the Anderson's application for an occupancy permit. The commission stated that 
"the Chipmans would not get a building permit until the problem was solved." (R. at 64.) 
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Defendants maintained that invalid assertion of interest for a period of ten months. 
Had defendants never asserted that interest, or had they provided documentation relinquishing 
any interest in the property when the law concerning boundary by acquiescence had been 
made clear to them, there would have been no need for plaintiffs to instigate this lawsuit 
against the defendants. However, plaintiffs were unable to proceed with the desired use of 
their land until the American Fork City Planning Commission could be assured that the 
dispute had been resolved. 
Plaintiffs' quiet title claim had merit because of defendants' assertion and 
maintenance, for a ten-month period, of an interest in plaintiffs' property after years of 
conduct which evidenced no such claim. By maintaining an invalid assertion of interest for 
almost a year, defendants knowingly interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their 
property rights, particularly their right to subdivide and use their property. Defendants later, 
through their attorney, verbally disclaimed their interest in plaintiffs' property but refused to 
execute written disclaimers or quit-claim deeds which would have verified to the American 
Fork Planning Commission that the dispute had been resolved. 
Under the circumstances, the only option plaintiffs had for obtaining such 
documentation was to proceed with litigation. Because of defendants' stubborn refusal to 
provide written confirmation documentation that they no longer claimed an interest in 
plaintiffs' property, the plaintiffs were left with no other choice but to file suit. Therefore, 
plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees incurred to obtain the confirmation was not made in bad 
faith. Plaintiffs had a legitimate concern in seeking a quit-claim deed or disclaimer from 
defendants because of defendants' own actions in this matter. 
Defendants argue that plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees was groundless because 
Defendant Miller had signed a quitclaim deed to the property and Defendants Anderson had 
never claimed an interest in the property. However, the quitclaim deed signed by Defendant 
Miller was not provided to plaintiffs until April 14, 1995, over a month after the filing of 
plaintiffs' complaint and ten months after she had first asserted an interest in the property. 
During that ten-month period, plaintiffs had incurred significant legal expenses in attempting 
to convince Defendant Miller that her assertion of interest in the plaintiffs' property was 
invalid. As to the Defendants Anderson, Defendant Miller had represented to plaintiffs, their 
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counsel, and the American Fork City Planning Commission that Defendants Anderson's 
property interests were involved and that Defendants Anderson would not sign a quitclaim 
deed because they needed additional footage beyond the fence line in order to occupy their 
property. Defendants Anderson did not respond to a demand letter from plaintiffs' counsel; 
accordingly, Defendants Anderson were included as named defendants in plaintiffs' 
complaint. Defendants Anderson did not disclaim any interest in the property until after the 
complaint had been filed. For these reasons, plaintiffs' complaint against Defendant Miller 
and Defendants Anderson was made in good faith. 
Defendants also argue that plaintiffs' conduct evidenced bad faith because plaintiffs 
failed to bring the case of Draper v. J.B. & R.E. Walker. Inc.. 204 P.2d 826 (1949) to the 
court's notice and failed to abandon their claim for attorney fees after defendants disclosed 
that case to the court and to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs did not feel this case was relevant to their 
suit and accordingly did not feel it their responsibility to bring this case to the court's notice, 
nor did plaintiffs feel that the case was a "controlling adverse decision" which mandated 
abandonment of plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees. Plaintiffs take the same position 
concerning the case of Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield. 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988), also 
cited by defendants. Both of these cases are distinguishable from the case at hand and deal 
with claims for damages. References in the Utah Code to "damages", as pointed out later in 
Section II C of this brief, are not the equivalent to "attorneys fees". 
By awarding attorney fees to defendants under these circumstances, the trial court 
inappropriately rewarded defendants for intentionally provoking unnecessary litigation. 
Because this lawsuit was provoked by defendants' bad faith conduct, plaintiffs' claims for 
attorney fees did indeed have merit. Accordingly, the trial court's award of attorney fees to 
defendants should be reversed. 
C. Absent any bad faith on plaintiffs' part, the trial court's award of 
attorney fees to defendants should be reversed. 
Defendants also argue that, absent any evidence of bad faith on plaintiffs' part, the 
trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants should nonetheless be affirmed based upon 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and Utah R. Civ. P. 11 because plaintiffs "could not have made 
a reasonable inquiry" which would have revealed that neither the statute nor case law 
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authorize or support an award of pre-complaint attorney's fees. This argument is based upon 
defendants' belief that plaintiffs should agree that an award of "attorney fees" is prohibited 
(a) by case law prohibiting an award of "damages" and (b) by a statute prohibiting an award 
of "costs." 
Plaintiffs' interpretation of statutes and case law which might justify or prohibit an 
award of attorney fees does not constitute bad faith. The fact that plaintiffs did not consider 
the cases upon which defendants rely to be applicable, much less controlling, to plaintiffs' 
claim for attorney fees does not mean plaintiffs failed to make a reasonable inquiry into 
relevant law. Although contrary to defendants' interpretation, plaintiffs' interpretation is 
reasonable and plaintiffs' conduct pursuant to that interpretation does not provide justification 
for the trial court's finding that plaintiffs acted in bad faith in pursuing that claim. 
When a party's position is subject to reasonable interpretation, conduct based on 
that interpretation does not constitute bad faith. In the case of Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar 
Co.. 684 P.2d 307 (Idaho App. 1984), the lessee of a farm sought judgment against 
Amalgamated Sugar Company, a crop purchaser, for payment to lessee of his share of 
proceeds by separate checks rather than paying the full amount by joint checks which 
included the landowner lessor as an additional payee. The landowner intervened in the case, 
and the trial court awarded attorney fees against the landowner lessor under an Idaho statute 
authorizing an award of attorney fees for frivolously bringing, pursuing or defending a civil 
case. The trial court determined that the landowner's intervention deviated from reasonable 
standards of conduct and was frivolously and unreasonably brought and pursued. The 
appellate court disagreed and reversed the award of attorney fees: 
A misperception of law or of one's interest under the law is not, by itself, 
unreasonable conduct. It if were, virtually every case controlled by a 
question of law would entail an attorney fee award against the losing party 
under I.C. § 12-121. Rather, the question must be whether the position 
adopted by the owner was not only incorrect but so plainly fallacious that 
it could be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. 
Id. at 313. The court went on to state that, "[ajlthough [procedural questions] have been 
decided adversely to the owner, the issues were genuine and fairly debatable." Id. 
Accordingly, the fact that plaintiffs in the present case disagree with defendants as to the 
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interpretation and relevancy of certain case law is not sufficient for a finding of bad faith on 
plaintiffs' part which would justify the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Indeed, given that plaintiffs dispute the relevance and 
effect of these cases on the present case, it is odd that defendants should accuse plaintiffs of 
inadequate reasonable inquiry for their failure to bring the Draper case to the attention of the 
court and conduct themselves in accordance with the Draper decision when defendants 
themselves did not cite the Draper case (a case they claim to be in their favor as a 
controlling case), until after all of the parties' pleadings had been submitted. 
It is ridiculous to expect plaintiffs to have anticipated and addressed defendants' 
logic in construing case law, let alone agree with it, prior to plaintiffs' reading of that logic 
in defendants' pleadings. Because plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees was not made in bad 
faith, the trial court erred in awarding defendants attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-56. Therefore, the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants should rest 
solely on Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the basis for the trial court's decision that plaintiffs 
acted in bad faith when pursuing their claim for attorney fees. If this court finds the trial 
court erred in attributing bad faith conduct to plaintiffs, then the trial court's award of 
attorney fees to defendants should be reversed. 
H. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
Plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees was made pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56, the bad faith statute, which allows attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in 
civil cases when "the action or defense to the action was without merit and not. . . asserted 
in good faith." Because of defendants' bad faith conduct, plaintiffs, as the prevailing party 
in the substantive issues of this case, are entitled to attorney fees despite the prohibition 
against "costs" in Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3. 
A. Plaintiffs prevailed on all the substantive issues in this action. 
Plaintiffs filed suit in this matter to quiet title in their property. Plaintiffs achieved 
the object of their suit when defendants disclaimed any interest in the property. This makes 
plaintiffs the prevailing party in the action and satisfies the prevailing-party requirement of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. Therefore, upon the court's determination that defendants acted 
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in bad faith, thereby unnecessarily provoking the litigation, plaintiffs are entitled to 
attorney's fees in this matter. 
B. Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-56 because defendants acted in bad faith, thereby unnecessarily 
provoking litigation. 
Although defendants disclaimed their interest in plaintiffs' property in the 
defendants' answer to plaintiffs' complaint, the defendants' conduct for almost a year 
evidenced their bad faith efforts to interfere with plaintiffs' fundamental property rights. For 
many years, both parties had recognized and acquiesced in the fence line as representing the 
boundary between their properties. When defendants suddenly asserted an interest in 
plaintiffs' property adjacent to the fence, the plaintiffs' subdivision and building permit were 
denied. Plaintiffs were unable to use and subdivide their property until April 14, 1995, when 
Defendant Miller signed and tendered a quitclaim deed to the plaintiffs' attorney. 
Defendants are wrong when they advance a policy argument suggesting that if 
property owners are allowed reimbursement for attorney fees incurred when seeking 
disclaimers of invalid interests that will prompt property owners to unreasonably and without 
basis imagine a claim might, at some unknown future date, be made against their property. 
This assumes that a plaintiff would instigate legal action without provocation. The opposite 
could, and in the present case does, exist: Persons who know they have no valid interest in 
another's property can pursue or provoke unnecessary litigation by frivolously asserting an 
invalid interest to that property, thereby intentionally interfering with the landowner's 
property rights, without having to recompense the other party for either the legal expenses 
incurred in rebutting that claim or the inconvenience or damages resulting from the 
infringement of the landowner's property rights. 
The case law cited by defendants states there is no affirmative duty to disclaim an 
invalid interest in property; presumably the purpose here is to protect a party from the type 
of scenarios presented by defendants. However, it would be inequitable and against public 
policy to apply those laws to a case in which the party seeking to invoke that case law took 
affirmative actions to assert an invalid interest which resulted in lengthy delay, inconvenience 
and expense to the landowner. 
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In the present case, defendants certainly provoked plaintiffs into filing and pursuing 
this lawsuit by asserting an interest which defendants knew had no basis in law or in fact. 
Defendants' conduct made it impossible for plaintiffs to enjoy their fundamental property 
rights. Given Defendant Miller's past conduct in acknowledging the fence line as the 
boundary line, her sudden assertion of an interest in the property adjacent to the fence line 
evidences her knowing intention "to take an unconscionable advantage of [plaintiffs] . . . 
[and to] . . . hinder, delay or defraud" plaintiffs. Cady v. Johnson. 671 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs' actions in seeking to quiet title to their property were made necessary by 
defendants' bad faith conduct. Defendants admit that had Defendant Miller maintained her 
unreasonable position after plaintiffs' complaint was filed, "plaintiffs might have had cause to 
seek attorney fees." Because defendants made no defense to plaintiffs' quiet title claim, 
defendants now claim that their defense was not made in bad faith when it was in fact 
defendants' conduct which provoked unnecessary litigation. 
Public policy should not allow one party, knowing his claim to be invalid, to cause 
another to incur legal costs without requiring the offending party to reimburse the other. 
Here, plaintiffs incurred significant legal expenses attempting to resolve this matter outside of 
court. Notions of judicial economy should find such efforts admirable and desirable. 
However, denying plaintiffs reimbursement for those expenses would serve to discourage 
future attempts to avoid unnecessary litigation in such situations. 
C. "Attorney fees11 are separate and distinct from "costs" and "damages," 
and plaintiffs are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to the 
statutes involved in this case. 
The trial court based its denial of plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees on Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-40-3, the quiet title statute, which prohibits an award of "costs" against a 
defendant who disclaims in his answer any interest in the property involved in a quiet title 
action. However, the statute says nothing about prohibiting an award of "attorney fees." 
Utah statutes generally do distinguish between "costs," "damages," and "attorney fees." 
Indeed, an examination of the index to the Utah Code reveals numerous examples of statutes 
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separately addressing "costs" or "attorney fees," and many others which address both "costs" 
and "attorney fees."1 
The general rule, also known as the American rule, concerning attorney fees is that 
"[fjees paid to attorneys are ordinarily not recoverable from the opposing party as costs, in 
the absence of express statutory or contractual authority authorizing the taxing of attorney's 
fees as costs." 20 Am. Jur.2d Costs § 57. An example of a statute authorizing the taxing of 
attorney fees as costs is seen in Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18, which states that, "in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover 
a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action." In United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co.. 185 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 
1950), the United States District Court for the District of Utah acknowledged that "[t]he right 
to recover attorney's fees as part of the cost of an action did not exist at common law. In 
the absence of an agreement, the right thereto is purely statutory." Id. at 448. The court 
then determined that the contract between the parties controlled in that situation because no 
statute dealing with attorney fees existed for that type of case. &. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that, "In construing constitutional as well as 
statutory provisions, it is to be assumed that the words used were chosen advisedly, and 
terms should be given an interpretation and an application in accord with their commonly 
understood meaning." Nephi City v. Hansen. 779 P.2d 673 (Utah 1989). The plain 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the quiet title statute under which the trial court 
denied plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees, merely prohibits an award of "costs" and says 
nothing whatsoever about "attorney fees." Indeed, an examination of the two statutes 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 7-15-1(3) (authorizing an award of "all costs of collection, 
including all court costs and reasonable attorney fees"); § 16-10a-1331 (authorizing an 
assessment of costs, fees, and expenses of counsel and experts); § 57-15-9 (authorizing 
"actual damages plus all reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred by the injured party"); § 
57-16-8 (authorizing "court costs and reasonable attorney's fees"); § 67-21-5 (authorizing "all 
or a portion of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney fees and witness fees"); § 
78-11-10 (authorizing "payment to the defendant of all costs and expenses that may be 
awarded against such plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be fixed by the 
court"). 
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involved in this case shows that Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 prohibits an award of "costs" 
when a defendant's answer disclaims interest in property, whereas Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-
56 requires an award of "attorney fees" when bad faith is proven. The fact that these two 
statutes distinguish between "costs" and "attorney fees" is evidence that Utah law does not 
consider them to be interchangeable terms. This supports plaintiffs' argument that the trial 
court erred in denying plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees based on the language of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-40-3. 
Defendants argue that, even if the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs' claim for 
attorney fees based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3, the trial court's decision should be 
affirmed because there is other appropriate justification for the decision. Defendants cite 
both the Draper and Nield cases in support of their argument that, because there is no duty 
to affirmatively disclaim an invalid interest, damages cannot be awarded against a person 
who refuses to do so. Neither the Draper nor Nield decisions were based on Utah Code 
Ann. 78-27-56, which is the basis of the plaintiffs' claim. For the purposes of the argument 
that Draper and Nield are somehow on point and controlling cases on this issue, defendants 
apparently consider "attorney fees" the equivalent of "damages"; however, defendants have 
cited no cases equating the two. (Although the Draper court reversed the trial court's award 
of damages, including attorney fees, on the ground that there is no duty to affirmatively 
disclaim an invalid interest, it did so without addressing the question of whether "attorney 
fees" should be considered "damages.") 
While urging this court to accept Draper and Nield and their prohibitions against 
any award of "damages" as controlling case law, defendants also cite Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. 
v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), which state that "[attorney fees are 
more properly considered costs" as opposed to damages. It seems that defendants wish to 
equate "attorney fees" with "damages" in order to find the Draper and Nield cases applicable 
to the present case, while simultaneously equating "attorney fees" with "costs" in order to 
find Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 applicable. In attempting to argue that attorney fees should 
be considered "damages" on the one hand and "costs" on the other hand, defendants 
themselves illustrate the confusion which often results when statutory language is loosely 
interpreted. 
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As defendants acknowledge, the trial court did not rely on the Draper or Nield 
cases in denying plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees. Rather, the trial court relied on Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-40-3, which prohibits an award of "costs" but says nothing about prohibiting 
an award of "attorney fees." Plaintiffs seek reversal of the trial court's denial of their claim 
for attorney fees because "attorney fees" do not equal "costs." 
Defendants further argue that the Nield and Draper cases establish that there is no 
right of action in Utah for recovery of pre-complaint damages for failure to disclaim an 
interest in property. While plaintiffs are aware of no case law approving an award of pre-
litigation attorney fees, neither have defendants cited any case law holding such an award to 
be inappropriate. In fact, defendants' counsel prevailed on a previous appeal before the Utah 
Supreme Court on the issue of awarding attorney fees for the preparation of a complaint. 
Alexander v. Brown. 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982). Unlike the present case, the award of 
attorney fees in Alexander was based on a contract; however, Alexander does support 
plaintiffs' argument that, at a minimum, attorney fees incurred in the preparation of the 
plaintiffs' complaint can appropriately be awarded along with subsequent attorney fees 
incurred in bringing or defending against a lawsuit. When, as here, a party is forced to 
initiate legal action to protect themselves and their property rights from an affirmatively 
asserted invalid interest, Nield and Draper ought not be used to protect the party whose 
conduct knowingly and unnecessarily provoked the litigation. 
Regardless of whether or not pre-litigation attorney fees are awarded in this case, 
the trial court erred in using the amount of attorney fees requested by plaintiffs as a factor 
when denying plaintiffs attorney fees. If a trial court determines that the amount of attorney 
fees requested is excessive, it has the discretion to reduce the amount of attorney fees it 
awards without denying attorney fees completely or inappropriately awarding attorney fees to 
the non-prevailing party. Even if as a result of this litigation this court articulates case law 
that denies plaintiffs pre-litigation attorney fees, the trial court here should have made an 
award of post-litigation attorney fees to plaintiffs. The trial court chose instead to completely 
deny any award of attorney fees to plaintiffs, and under the facts of this case, that decision 
was in error and should be reversed. 
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Plaintiffs in the present case argue that Utah statutes do differentiate between 
"costs" and "attorney fees11, pursuant to the legislature's intentions. The plain language of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-3 does not prohibit an award of attorney fees to plaintiffs in this 
case, and this court should reverse the trial court's denial of attorney fees based on that 
statute. 
HI. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DOUBLE COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. 
Defendants seek, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 33(a), an award of double costs and 
attorney fees incurred in responding to this appeal. Defendants' arguments are based upon 
their assertion that plaintiffs' appeal is frivolous because the Draper and Nield cases provided 
plaintiffs with "actual notice that existing Utah law barred plaintiffs' action." As discussed 
above, plaintiffs dispute the applicability of these cases to the present case and therefore, 
contrary to defendants' assertions, had no obligation to affirmatively bring these cases up, 
and then distinguish them, when arguing for summary disposition. For the same reasons, 
plaintiffs' appeal of the trial court's judgment is not frivolous and defendants should not be 
awarded reimbursement for any expenses incurred as a result of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Although defendants ultimately did provide plaintiffs with the necessary 
documentation disclaiming any interest in plaintiffs' property subsequent to the filing of 
plaintiffs' claim, it was defendants' own conduct that made it necessary for plaintiffs to go to 
court in the first place. Had Defendant Miller not asserted an interest she knew to be 
invalid, and had she not stubbornly clung to that position with the intention to hinder, delay, 
defraud or take advantage of plaintiffs, it would not have been necessary for plaintiffs to 
incur attorney fees involved in a quiet title action. Under these circumstances, which 
demonstrate defendants' bad faith, plaintiffs were justified in filing their quiet title claim and 
/// 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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are entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to the bad faith statute. For these reasons, 
this appeal is not frivolous and defendants should not be awarded double costs and attorney 
fees, and the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants should be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this U day of A^fr^A*? 
1996. 
GORDON DUVAL 
Attorney for Appellants 
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